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ABSTRACT 
On February 17
th
, 2003, the London Congestion Charging Scheme came into effect. 
Preliminary results show a significant response to the £5 ($8) charge. Congestion over the 
first year decreased by 30 per cent, overall traffic levels within the charging zone fell by 
16 per cent, speeds for car travel increased by over 20 per cent and bus travel became 
more reliable. 
Elasticities of demand for trips by car with respect to generalized costs are estimated 
to be between –1.32 and –2.10. The average marginal congestion cost within the central 
zone is estimated at £1.65 per veh-km (approximately $2.58 per veh-km). 
The net economic benefits of the Scheme for the first year were £50 million ($78 
million) and the net revenues, £68 million ($106 million). Net revenues are being mainly 
used to improve public transport. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) depicts a classic example of the 
harmful effects of unabated negative externalities. In Hardin’s story, the villagers of a 
small English town have equal and free access to a commons wherein they can place their 
animals. When making the decision to add a cow to the commons, a villager takes into 
account the animal’s own ability to graze and roam, but not its effect on others. This is 
the classic description of the so-called free-rider problem commonly associated with 
public goods. 
The modern version of Hardin’s story could easily be depicted using drivers as, 
perhaps unflatteringly, the cows and roads in place of the commons. When a potential 
driver makes the decision to use private transport by comparing his marginal private 
costs and benefits he typically excludes from the analysis any external costs that his 
action of driving may impose upon others. Arthur Pigou, a Cambridge economist, first 
identified this problem of ‘divergences between marginal social and private net products’ 
in his book The Economics of Welfare (Pigou, 1920). To remedy this problem, Pigou 
proposed a tax or levy be imposed on drivers to ensure that their perceived private costs 
were consistent with the true social costs of driving. 
More recently, the city of London has taken Pigou’s idea from theory to practice. 
Since February 17
th
, 2003, motorists within the central London area are required to pay a 
£5 charge (approximately $8) for the right to drive or park within the zone. The charge 
differs from a true Pigouvian tax in that it is not equal to the marginal congestion cost 
(MCC). A charge equal to the MCC would vary with time and location. Although 
technically the charge does differ temporally in that the license costs £5 between 7am and 
6.30pm from Monday to Friday, versus £0 at all other times, true marginal cost pricing 
(or Pigouvian taxation) would require more finely-tuned spatial and temporal differences. 
Nevertheless, the London Congestion Charging Scheme is a dramatic step towards 
internalizing the externalities associated with driving. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze some of the preliminary effects, as recently 
published by Transport for London (TfL, 2003a, b, 2004). We briefly present the basic 
theory underlying optimal road pricing. We describe the London Scheme together with 
the preliminary results, which we then use to compute elasticities with respect to changes 
in generalized cost, as well as area marginal congestion costs. We then briefly touch on 
the costs and benefits of the Scheme, the use of revenues and the potential equity 
impacts. We conclude that the prevailing elasticities, as shown by motorists’ response to 
the Scheme, are higher than it was expected, probably because of the public transport 
system in London, which provides and alternative to the car, and that the calculated area 
MCC suggests that the £5 charge is a reasonable approximate to marginal cost pricing. 
 
THE ECONOMICS OF CONGESTION CHARGING 
Sub-optimal levels of congestion are a result of drivers failing to take into account the 
effect that their vehicle will have on others. This ‘neglected externality’ means that 
drivers will often use private vehicles when the net marginal social benefit of doing so is 
actually negative. 
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The optimal method of internalizing externalities is by marginal cost pricing, the 
basics of which were first proposed by Pigou (1920). The specific application of marginal 
cost pricing to a congested highway was more fully developed in a seminal paper by 
Walters (1961). Walters’ model is based on engineering-related speed-flow relationships 
on links to derive the optimal congestion charge. The formal derivations are shown 
below, following Newbery (1990) and Nash (1997). 
Assume a generalized travel cost per km function that consists of money costs (fuel, 
maintenance, etc) and time costs: 
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where g = generalized cost (pence per PCU-km) 
 m = money cost (pence per PCU-km) 
 b = value of time (pence per PCU-hour) 
 )(qs = speed as a function of total flow (km per hour) 
 q = flow (PCU per hour) 
and PCU stands for passenger car unit, a measure of the relative disruption that different 
vehicle types impose on the network. A car for example, has a PCU rating of 1, whereas a 
light goods vehicles has a PCU rating of 1.5, etc. In the US passenger car equivalents 
(PCE) are used instead. The meaning however is the same. 
Total costs (in pence per km-hour) are: 
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where sqe  is the elasticity of speed with respect to flow. 
This last expression clearly identifies the marginal social costs as a function of 
marginal private costs, g, plus an external cost term, the congestion externality. By way 
of a Pigouvian tax, an individual’s decision can be reconciled with the socially optimal 
choice. The tax in this case would be equal to sqe
qs
b
)(
 per PCU-km. 
Although the above concept of first-best road pricing remains central to transport 
theory, its application to a congested urban design poses a few problems. To begin with, 
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introducing marginal cost pricing in the transport sector does not guarantee an efficient 
outcome when there are externalities in other (related) sectors in the economy, which are 
not priced according to marginal cost. In addition to that, marginal cost pricing has 
proved difficult to implement in dense networks. In today’s technologically advanced 
world the calculation of instant marginal cost pricing may not be very difficult to 
envisage. Its cost effectiveness however would be dubious and most importantly, the 
transparency of such a system would be at least arguable, as drivers would not know the 
congestion charge they would be required to pay before starting their journey. Marginal 
cost pricing would require highly differentiated pricing systems in time and space, which 
would be expensive to provide and confusing to users (Nash and Sansom, 2001). 
Since marginal cost pricing is not very practical, transport economists have lately 
devoted their efforts to the study of second best alternatives (May et al, 2002; Verhoef, 
2002; Shepherd and Sumalee, 2004; Zhang and Yang, 2004) and policy makers have 
opted for simpler, less expensive and more practical and transparent options such as 
cordon tolls and area licensing schemes. Such is the case of the original Singaporean 
scheme, the Norwegian toll rings and the new London area license scheme. 
 
THE LONDON CONGESTION CHARGING SCHEME 
The London Scheme can trace its origin back to the Smeed report (Ministry of Transport, 
1964), which studied the technical feasibility of road pricing in the UK. Numerous 
studies have been produced since then, including the influential report by the TfL 
commissioned London Congestion Charging Research Programme (LCCRP) in 1995 
(MVA Consultancy, 1995). The LCCRP Final Report suggests as its “medium” case a £4 
electronic cordon toll (using Intra Vehicle Units) to enter a central London area, which is 
essentially identical to the ultimately chosen charging zone. The Road Charging Options 
for London (ROCOL) report published in 2000 followed the LCCRP. The ROCOL report 
(ROCOL Working Group, 2000) presents the technical details as well as predicted 
impacts of a variety of congestion reducing strategies including area licensing schemes 
and cordon tolls (central only and multi-zone; paper and electronic) as well as workplace 
parking levies. 
The discussion became closer to reality in May 2000, when Ken Livingstone was 
elected Mayor of London based on a manifesto promising the introduction of congestion 
charging. The then-recently passed Greater London Authority (GLA) Act 1999 (Acts of 
Parliament, 1999) gave this new Mayor the power, for the first time, to impose 
congestion charges.
1
 
The final decision, made by the Mayor, was to go with an area licensing scheme 
using a £5 charge applied to central London only. The method was chosen due to its 
relative ease of implementation as compared to full-scale road pricing. Automatic number 
plate recognition (ANPR) technology was selected as a “feasible intermediate” between 
                                               
1
 The following year the Transport Act 2000 (Acts of Parliament, 2000) was passed, allowing for 
joint schemes, including ones involving London authorities, as long as the order has been 
submitted to and confirmed by the Greater London Authority. This power to make joint local-
London charging schemes does not limit any of the powers to introduce road user charging in 
Greater London given by the Greater London Authority Act 1999. 
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an inexpensive but inefficient paper-based system and a sophisticated yet complex and 
expensive electronic road pricing scheme (ROCOL Working Group, 2000). 
One of the key features of the run-up to the Scheme was the extensive consultation 
process, which took place over 18 months, and included meetings with key stakeholders, 
thousands of information leaflets on the proposed Scheme being distributed to all the 33 
London boroughs and advertisements with details of the Scheme and how to participate 
in the consultation exercise being published in newspapers and broadcasted on radio 
stations. This consultation exercise increased the public acceptability of the Scheme. 
 
How the Scheme operates 
Figure 1 shows the limit of the area where the charges apply, the Inner Ring Road, which 
runs along Euston Road, Pentonville Road, City Road, Old Street, Commercial Street, 
Tower Bridge Road, New Kent Road, Kennington Lane, Vauxhall Bridge Road, Park 
Lane, Edgware Road and Marylebone Road. No charge is made for driving on the Inner 
Ring Road itself. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 Map of the charging zone 
Source: www.london.gov.uk/approot/mayor/congest/pdf/zone_map.pdf 
Map reproduced with permission from Transport for London 
 
We can see from the figure that the charging area is relatively small. It only covers   
21 km
2
 (8 mi
2
), representing 1.3 per cent of the total 1,579 km
2
 (617 mi
2
) of Greater 
London. 
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There are 174 entry and exit boundary points around the zone. Traffic signs make it 
clear where exactly the charging zone is. These are accompanied by a red symbol on each 
lane of traffic at the entry points to the charging zone. The Scheme charges all cars 
driving into or within the zone, as well as those parked in non-private spaces within the 
zone, regardless of movement. Essentially, one can consider the charge a ‘daypass’ for 
use of central London’s roads. The ROCOL report (2000) used a further scenario 
encompassing all of ‘inner London’, as well as a differentiated-price scheme using both 
zones. Ultimately, it was thought that implementing the Scheme in the somewhat more 
manageable smaller size of central London would be more suitable as a first step, with 
the possibility of later expansion. 
The applicable hours of the Scheme are 7 to 6.30pm, Monday to Friday, excluding 
bank and public holidays. This is a slight departure from the ROCOL recommendation of 
7am to 7pm. The decision to change the evening end-time was primarily a result of 
lobbying by the entertainment community. It was argued that having the charge apply 
until 7pm would damage the West End as it would discourage theatre-goers from coming 
downtown. 
The ROCOL consultants analyzed scenarios of £2.50, £5 and £10 charges using 
stated preference results from surveys as well as spatially-detailed representations of road 
traffic movements to estimate changes in travel conditions due to the introduction of area 
licensing. They predicted reductions in car trips and veh-km driven in Central London of 
20-23 per cent (ROCOL Working Group, 2000, p.69-70). These predictions are not out of 
line with what has actually happened. TfL (2004) reports reductions in veh-km driven 
within the charging zone during charging hours of 15 per cent for vehicles with four or 
more wheels between 2002 and 2003. For potentially chargeable vehicles (cars, van and 
lorries) the reduction of veh-km driven has been 25 per cent. When only cars are 
considered, veh-km driven have been reduced by 34 per cent. 
Due to the unsophisticated nature of an area licensing scheme, the system lacks the 
ability to adequately charge differentiated prices both temporally and spatially. 
Ultimately, the Mayor settled upon the £5 charge, deciding that it provided adequate 
incentive to achieve significant congestion reduction, but with less public backlash likely 
to be associated with a £10 charge. The heavy goods vehicle (HGV) charge, which was 
originally going to be £15 (three times the car charge), was reduced to be the same as that 
for cars. 
The Scheme allows for a variety of 90-100 per cent discounts, as well as exemptions. 
A summary is shown in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 Exemptions and discounts 
 
Discount/Status Category 
Fully exempt Motorcycles, mopeds and bicycles 
Emergency Vehicles 
Public service vehicles with 9 or more seats licensed as buses 
Vehicles used by (and for) disabled persons that are exempt from 
VED*
 
Licensed London taxis and mini-cabs 
100% discount with free 
registration 
Certain military vehicles 
Local government service vehicles (e.g. refuse trucks, street 
maintenance) 
Vehicles with 9 or more seats not licensed as buses (e.g. community 
minibuses) 
100% discount with a 
one-off £10 registration 
Vehicles driven by (or for) individuals or institutions that are Blue 
Badge holders** 
100% discount with £10 
registration 
Alternative fuel vehicles – requires emission savings 40% above Euro 
IV standards 
Roadside assistance vehicles (e.g. motoring organizations such as the 
Automobile Association) 
90% discount with £10 
registration 
Vehicles registered to residents of the central zone 
 
 
Source: TfL, Congestion Charging Website 
www.cclondon.com/exemptions.shtml 
 
*VED: Vehicle excise duty 
 
**
Blue Badges, which existed before the scheme was implemented, are special parking 
permits issued to disabled people to allow them to park near shops, stations, and other 
facilities. The badge belongs to the disabled person who qualifies for it (who may or may 
not be a car driver) and can be used in any vehicle they are traveling in. 
 
 
Payments can be made by a variety of methods. These are shown in Table 2, along 
with their share of use during the first year. 
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TABLE 2 Methods of payment 
 
 
 
Percentage 
(%) 
 
Retail outlets 36 
Telephone 19 
Post <1 
Internet 26 
SMS text messaging 19 
 
Source: Transport for London (2004, p.30) 
Note: SMS: Short Message Service 
 
 
The charge has to be paid in advance or on the day until 10pm with late payment 
available between 10pm and midnight but with the charge rising to £10 ($16). The charge 
can be paid daily, weekly, monthly or yearly. It is at the drivers’ initiative to pay the 
charge. 
Enforcement is undertaken with video cameras. There is a network of 203 camera 
sites, with these located at every entrance and exit to the congestion charging zone as 
well as inside the charging zone. The cameras provide high-quality video signals to 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) software, which reads and records each 
number plate, with a 90 per cent accuracy rate. At midnight, images of all of the vehicles 
that have been in the congestion charging zone are checked against the vehicle 
registration numbers of vehicles which have paid their congestion charge for that day. 
The computer keeps the registration numbers of vehicles that should have paid but have 
not done so. A manual check of each recorded image is then made and a Penalty Charge 
Notice of £80 ($126) is then issued to the registered keeper of the vehicle. As with 
parking penalties, this amount is reduced to £40 ($63) for prompt payment within 14 
days. Failure to pay the penalty charge within 28 days results in the penalty being 
increased to £120 ($190). 
 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE LONDON SCHEME 
In this section we summarize the traffic impacts of the Scheme over the first year. 
 
Effects on traffic 
According to TfL (2003a, b, 2004), the average travel speed in the charging zone in the 
first few months after the Scheme was implemented was 17 km/h (10.6 mi/h) and this 
continued over the first year. This number can be compared with the average speed pre-
charging, which was 14 km/h (8.7 mi/h), as listed in the TfL First Annual Report (2003c, 
p.52). There has therefore been a 21 per cent increase in average travel speeds in the 
charging area. 
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Congestion is defined by TfL as “the difference between the average network travel 
rate and the uncongested (free-flow) network travel rate in minutes per veh-km” (TfL, 
2003b, p.46). Using the uncongested network travel rate of 1.9 min/km (approx. 32 km/h) 
from TfL (2003b, p.52), and pre- and post-charging average travel rates of 4.2 and 3.5 
min/km respectively, it can be seen that congestion has decreased from 2.3 to 1.6 
min/km. Note that the optimal amount of congestion is not zero congestion. Zero 
congestion would suggest an under-use of road-space. On the other hand, TfL admits that 
there is an ‘optimal’ level of congestion, which is achieved at the ‘optimal’ level of 
traffic. However, it considers the optimal level of congestion difficult to define and that is 
the reason why it defines congestion using free-flow time as the base (TfL, 2003b). 
Bearing this caveat in mind, we can conclude that congestion has been reduced by 30.5 
per cent. This calculated value is roughly equal to the listed value in the ‘Update of 
Scheme Impacts and Operations’ (TfL, 2004, point 1.8, p.4) of 30 per cent. Furthermore, 
it is in line, although at the upper end, with expectations of congestion reduction of 
between 20 and 30 per cent. 
Traffic levels are a measure of the volume or number of vehicles entering or driving 
within central London. Compared to pre-charging conditions, the count of all cars 
entering the central zone has decreased by 31 per cent. However, the reduction in the 
number of cars has been partially offset by increases in incoming motorcycles (by 19 per 
cent), taxis (by 19 per cent) and buses (by 16 per cent). Traffic levels (all vehicles) inside 
the central zone have decreased by 15 per cent, again roughly in line (but at the upper 
end) with TfL’s expectations of 10-15 per cent. 
Finally, travel times have also showed significant improvements. Travel times to 
central London from outer London, inner London, and central London have all decreased. 
A basket of 5000 journeys from all areas of greater London showed a reduction in travel 
times of 13 per cent (TfL, 2003b, point 2.4, p.5). 
A summary of the above results is shown in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3 Preliminary effects on traffic 
 
  
Pre-charging 
 
 
Post-charging 
 
 
Change 
(%) 
 
Average speed 14 km/h 17 km/h +21 
Congestion 2.3 min/km 1.6 min/km –30.5 
Traffic levels*  
 - incoming (cars only) 193,912 133,016 –31 
 - incoming (non-cars) 178,149 193,485 +9 
 - inside central zone n/a n/a –16 
Travel times to central zone  
 - from Outer London 59 min 52 min –12 
 - from Inner London 37 min 33 min –11 
 - from Central London 38 min 35 min –8 
 - basket of 5000 journeys 47 min 41 min –13 
 
Source: Transport for London (2003a, b, Fig. 5, p.5) 
*Data supplied by Transport for London on request 
Note: Pre-charging: spring 2002, Post-charging: spring 2003 
 
 
Since traffic traveling on the Inner Ring Road does not pay the congestion charge, 
TfL expected that through traffic, with origin and destination outside the charging zone, 
would divert and use the Inner Ring Road instead. This indeed happened raising the total 
veh-km on the Inner Ring Road by 4 per cent when compared with 2002 (TfL, 2004). 
However, improved traffic management arrangements were put into place on the Inner 
Ring Road before the Scheme started and this prevented an increase in congestion. For 
example, between one and two seconds were taken off green light time on radial roads, 
which were anticipated would have less traffic, and added on to green light time on the 
Inner Ring Road. That made a sufficient difference to keep the Ring Road operating 
satisfactorily with marginally lower levels of congestion, when compared to pre-charging 
conditions. 
Trafficmaster PLC, a private company that provides real-time traffic information on 
major routes, began a study on 17 February 2003 to assess the commuting impacts of the 
Scheme outside the zone. Although after six months of monitoring, average travel times 
recorded by Trafficmaster had increased on most routes, there were no constant patterns. 
Table 4 shows the average of travel times (in minutes) and travel time changes for the 
first seven months after the Scheme was introduced. We can see from the table that most 
routes had longer travel times. Table 5 gives some examples of how travel time on some 
routes increased and decreased in comparison to the same month the year before, and 
shows that there is no constant pattern of variation. 
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TABLE 4 Average workday travel times into London (morning peak) 
 
Route 
 
 
 
 
Orientation 
 
 
Feb-Sep 
2002 
(min) 
 
 
Feb-Sep 
2003 
(min) 
 
 
Change 
(%) 
 
 
A1 Mill Hill to Islington N-NW 46 49 7 
A41 Mill Hill, Five Ways to Regent’s Park NW 36 38 6 
A40/M Denham to Marylebone W 62 61 –3 
A4 Langley, Slough to Talgarth Road W 57 57 1 
A30 Stanwell to Osterley W-SW 15 16 6 
A316 Sunbury Cross to Ravenscourt Park W-SW 40 41 2 
A3 Cobham to Clapham SW 50 62 25 
A23 Hooley to Brixton S 59 64 8 
A20 Swanley to Eltham SE 20 23 14 
A2/A102 Dartford to Blackwall Tunnel E-SE 39 44 14 
A12 Harold Wood to Blackwall Tunnel E-NE 66 72 9 
A10 Waltham Cross to Stoke Newington N 44 51 15 
 
Source: Trafficmaster PLC (data supplied on request) 
 
TABLE 5 Examples of non-constant patterns in percentage changes in travel times 
 
Route 
 
 
 
April ‘02 
(min) 
 
 
April ‘03 
(min) 
 
 
Change 
(%) 
 
 
May ‘02 
(min) 
 
 
May ‘03 
(min) 
 
 
Change 
(%) 
 
 
A1 Mill Hill to Islington 
A41 Mill Hill, Five Ways to 
Regent’s Park 
A40/M Denham to Marylebone 
A4 Langley, Slough to Talgarth 
Road 
A30 Stanwell to Osterley 
A316 Sunbury Cross to 
Ravenscourt Park 
A3 Cobham to Clapham 
A23 Hooley to Brixton 
A20 Swanley to Eltham 
A2/A102 Dartford to Blackwall 
Tunnel 
A12 Harold Wood to Blackwall 
Tunnel 
A10 Waltham Cross to Stoke 
Newington 
 
 
50.1 
35.8 
65.4 
58.6 
16.5 
42.9 
58.4 
66 
23 
46.7 
72.5 
55.8 
 
51.7 
38.4 
68.9 
56.1 
17.5 
39.7 
59.3 
66.7 
23.2 
46.7 
70.7 
58.1 
 
3 
7 
5 
-4 
6 
-7 
2 
1 
1 
0 
-2 
4 
 
55.4 
42 
62.6 
64.4 
14.8 
44.3 
51.2 
64.8 
21.7 
40.7 
71.7 
53.4 
 
53.9 
46.4 
58.7 
59.7 
17.7 
48.4 
66 
71.6 
26 
45.8 
69.4 
57 
 
-3 
10 
-6 
-7 
20 
9 
29 
10 
20 
13 
-3 
7 
 
Source: Trafficmaster PLC (data supplied on request) 
Note: Both months are within school term 
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The apparent contradiction between Tables 3 and 4 can be explained by the fact that 
Table 4 measures travel times all the way up to and including the charging zone, where 
travel times have decreased and therefore push the average down. Table 4 on the other 
hand, does not include any road inside the charging zone. 
 
Effects on public transport 
TfL predicted that approximately 20,000 individuals would switch from car travel to 
public transport during the morning peak period as a result of the Scheme. Of this 
number, 5,000 were expected to use the Underground system, 14,000, the buses, with the 
remainder using rail system without transfers to bus or underground. It was also expected 
that the morning peak hour (8-9am) increase would be of an additional 7,000 bus users 
(TfL, 2002a). 
Although bus ridership increased in line with expectations, Underground travel did 
not. Underground usage across London and specially in central London decreased. The 
reasons for the decrease in passenger levels on the London Underground are probably 
linked to the slowdown of the economy and the decrease in tourism in London, which in 
turn may be linked to the war in Iraq (TfL, 2003a). In addition to that, the Central Line 
was temporarily closed for almost three months following a derailment at Chancery Lane 
station in January. 
Average bus speeds in the morning peak did not change too much and it is difficult to 
establish a pattern of variation. Whilst speeds on some route sections increased, speeds 
on others decreased (TfL, 2003a). On the other hand, additional time waited by 
passengers over and above the route schedule decreased by 25 per cent across Greater 
London and by over 33 per cent in the routes serving the Charging zone and the Inner 
Ring Road (TfL, 2003a, point 3.75). To accommodate the increase in bus ridership, TfL 
increased the number of buses in the central zone by 19 per cent over the year previous to 
the introduction of the Scheme. Further to this, there were also improvements such as the 
addition of new routes, switching 10 major routes from single-deck to double-deck buses, 
as well as adding 18-metre ‘bendy’ buses to heavily traveled routes. 
The provision of good public transport is a key part of implementing a fair pricing 
scheme. If there are no, or inferior, public transport alternatives, then a road pricing 
scheme is just a regressive tax on the middle and poor classes.
2
 With good public 
transport, road pricing is to some degree a luxury tax - without it, it is just a regressive 
tax. TfL’s increase in the bus service before and after the Scheme started is an example of 
changes that need to be a part of the process to promote fair social outcomes. 
 
Effects on other transport 
TfL (2003a, point 3.64) estimates that 15-25 per cent of the reduction in car use per 
charging day is the result of car users switching to other modes of transport, such as car 
share, motorcycles, and bicycles, or by making adaptations such as altering travel plans to 
avoid the charging hours or charging zone, and walking. As can be seen from Table 6 the 
                                               
2
 A brief discussion on the potential equity impacts of the Scheme is presented below. 
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total count of bicycles and motorcycles going into the charging zone increased by 31 and 
19 per cent respectively. Although both increases are higher than TfL’s expectations 
(2003a, point 3.38), they are not surprising, giving the fact that neither of those vehicle 
categories pays the charge. Surprisingly enough, the number of powered 2-wheelers 
(motorcycles and mopeds) and bicycles involved in accidents following the introduction 
of the Scheme fell by 15 per cent and 17 per cent respectively, when compared to the 
same period in 2002 (TfL, 2003a, point 3.97). These results probably reflect the long-
term trend of declining accidents in London rather than any feature linked to the Scheme. 
Incoming taxis also increased by 19 per cent, more than TfL expected (2003a, point 
3.38). In addition, the count of working vehicles, such as Light Goods Vehicles and 
Heavy Goods Vehicles decreased. 
Although when PCU ratings are taken into account the percentage changes change, 
the final results do not change too much, mainly as a consequence of traffic composition. 
Changes in vehicle counts and in PCU counts are all shown in Table 6. It can therefore be 
concluded that the increase in the use of buses, taxis, motorcycles and bicycles does not 
jeopardize the reduction in overall traffic, which has been larger than expected. There 
seem to be no grounds to extend the charge to include other vehicle categories, like it was 
done in Singapore. 
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TABLE 6 Vehicle counts pre and post charging 
 
 
 
Pedal 
Cycles 
 
Motor 
Cycles 
 
Cars 
 
 
Taxis 
 
 
 
Bus & 
Coach 
 
LGVs 
 
 
 
HGVs & 
Other 
 
4+ Wheels 
 
 
Total 
 
 
Total non-
cars 
 
Pedal and 
motorcycles 
 
 Spring 2002 incoming 
 Spring 2002 outgoing 
 Spring 2002 total 
 Spring 2003 incoming 
 Spring 2003 outgoing 
 Spring 2003 total 
 
 Changes (%) 
 Incoming vehicles 
 Outgoing vehicles 
 Total vehicles 
 
 PCU ratings 
 
 Changes (%) 
 Incoming PCUs 
 Outgoing PCUs 
 Total PCUs 
13,836 
11,346 
25,181 
18,131 
12,535 
30,666 
 
 
31 
10 
22 
 
0.2 
 
 
 
 
 
25,840 
22,940 
48,780 
30,779 
25,426 
56,205 
 
 
19 
11 
15 
 
0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
193,912 
192,840 
386,752 
133,016 
125,151 
258,168 
 
 
-31 
-35 
-33 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
55,971 
57,036 
113,007 
66,836 
64,917 
131,753 
 
 
19 
14 
17 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
13,393 
13,079 
26,472 
15,518 
15,735 
31,253 
 
 
16 
20 
18 
 
2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
53,780 
59,487 
113,267 
48,745 
50,660 
99,405 
 
 
-9 
-15 
-12 
 
1.5 
 
 
 
 
 
15,329 
16,256 
31,585 
13,476 
14,402 
27,878 
 
 
-12 
-11 
-12 
 
2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
332,386 
338,697 
671,083 
277,591 
270,865 
548,456 
 
 
-16 
-20 
-18 
 
 
 
 
-14 
-17 
-16 
372,062 
372,982 
745,044 
326,501 
308,826 
635,328 
 
 
-12 
-17 
-15 
 
 
 
 
-13 
-16 
-15 
178,149 
180,143 
358,292 
193,485 
183,675 
377,160 
 
 
9 
2 
5 
 
 
 
 
3 
-1 
1 
39,676 
34,285 
73,961 
48,910 
37,961 
86,871 
 
 
23 
11 
17 
 
 
 
 
21 
11 
16 
 
Source: Transport for London, data provided on request 
 
Note: PCU passenger car units, LGVs: Light Goods Vehicles, HGVs: Heavy Goods Vehicles 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section includes a calculation of the elasticity of demand for car trips with respect to 
the generalized cost of travel, as well as a calculation of the marginal cost of congestion 
within the central London zone. The results are then compared with estimates from the 
literature. 
 
 
Price elasticity of demand 
An elasticity measures the percentage change in one variable with respect to a percentage 
change in another. In this context, we can use it to measure the responsiveness of demand 
for trips due to a change in travel costs. The generalized costs of travel include both 
money costs and time costs, as defined in Equation 1. 
In order to proceed with the calculations, it is necessary to determine the average 
generalized cost of travel into central London. The UK Automobile Association provides 
detailed estimates of motoring costs (money costs) for cars, split out by fixed and 
variable costs (Automobile Association, 2003). The values depend on annual mileage (for 
fuel, maintenance, etc) and cost of vehicle (financing, insurance, depreciation). 
We had to make several assumptions in selecting the appropriate measure of motoring 
costs. Firstly, we chose the Automobile Association’s ‘above-average’ cost of car 
category to reflect the fact that the average Londoner has a higher income than the 
national average (National Statistics, 2003). The cost of a car affects the fixed costs of 
insurance and financing. To attain per km costs, we used the average annual distance 
driven by a Londoner of 8,800 km (5,466 mi) (TfL, 2001, p.2). The corresponding 
motoring costs for an average Londoner are thus roughly 47.5 pence/km ($1.2/mi), of 
which 12.25 pence (20 cents) are variable costs. The motoring costs are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7 Motoring costs 
 
Standing costs (£ annual) 
Road tax  160 
Insurance 448 
Cost of capital 412 
Depreciation 2080 
Standing costs total (pence per km) 35.2 
Running costs (pence per km) 
Fuel 7.18 
Service: tyres, parts and labor 3.95 
Parking 1.13 
Running costs total (pence per km) 12.25 
Total costs (pence per km) 47.48 
 
Source: UK Automobile Association 
www.theaa.com/allaboutcars/advice/advice_rcosts_home.html 
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To calculate time costs, it is necessary to determine a value of travel time savings 
(VTTS). The Transport Economics Note (Department of the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions, 2001) provides base figures and guidelines on how to estimate working and 
non-working VTTS. Another source for values of travel time savings in the UK is a 
report to the Department for Transport by Mackie et al (2003). This comprehensive 
report re-examines a substantial stated preference data set used in an earlier investigation 
commissioned by the same department in 1994. Additionally, the results are cross-
referenced with those obtained from meta-analysis
3
. Table 8 details some of their 
recommended estimates. 
 
TABLE 8 Estimates of the value of car travel time savings at end of 1997 values 
 
Income Band Commuting (p/min) Other (p/min) 
Below £17,500 3.6 4.6 
£17,500 - £35,000 5.9 5.9 
Above £35,000 8.6 7.1 
 
Source: Mackie et al (2003) 
Note: p/min: pence per minute 
 
 
Although we computed the elasticity of demand following the Transport Economics 
Note (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2001) in the first 
instance, we also used another set of values following the recommendations in Mackie et 
al (2003). The main difference between the two documents is that Mackie et al (2003) 
recognizes that although commuting trips are non-working they tend to have a slightly 
higher VTTS than shopping or leisure trips.
4
 
In order to produce working and non-working VTTS following the Transport 
Economics Note (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2001), we 
updated the values given there to 2003 prices. We also increased the working value of 
time by 34 per cent, to reflect the difference in the average earnings in London, as 
indicated in the New Earnings Survey 2003 (National Statistics, 2003). We considered 
two categories of trips: working, as trips made in the course of work, excluding 
commuting, and non-working. We estimated the working VTTS at 42.2 pence/min and 
the non-working VTTS at 4.9 pence/min. TfL provided us with provisional data 
indicating that 10 per cent of car trips in London are business trips. The weighted VTTS 
we used was therefore 8.6 pence/min. Using the average car occupancy rate of 1.35 (TfL, 
2002b, p.19), this amounts to 11.7 pence/PCU-min. Other numbers needed to calculate 
the elasticities are shown in Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 Statistical analysis that involves integrating results of many independent studies on the same 
issue. 
4
 This is probably because of the potential penalty for arriving late. 
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TABLE 9 Details of an average trip by car in London 
 
Distance traveled per day* 23.4 km 
Time traveled per day (pre-charging)** 94 min 
Time savings per day (post-charging) 12 min 
Vehicle costs 47.5 pence/km 
Running costs 12.3 pence/km 
Value of time per car 11.7 pence/min 
Average occupancy 1.35 
 
Source: see text 
*TfL concludes that the average car trip in London is 11.7 km (TfL, 2002, Table 7.1, 
p.25) and two trips per day are assumed in this study 
**For travel times, see Table 3 
 
 
Using all this information, we computed the percentage change in generalized costs. 
We estimated elasticities of demand for trips by car with respect to changes in 
generalized costs including all vehicle costs, as well as generalized costs including time 
costs and car running costs but excluding fixed costs. For a change in travel demand, the 
appropriate statistic is the 31 per cent reduction in car travel entering the central zone. 
This statistic best represents the demand response of those who are not exempt from the 
charge, such as residents. Unfortunately it is not possible to determine whether the 
reduction in demand for car trips is entirely the result of the charge or the result of a 
combination of factors in addition to the charge, such as for example, the economic 
slowdown. 
Table 10 presents the results. The most relevant value in the short run is –1.32, as that 
excludes fixed costs from the calculations. 
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TABLE 10 Elasticities of demand for car trips with respect to costs 
 
 All GC GC exc. 
fixed 
costs 
Occupancy rate 1.35 1.35 
Average car trip (km) 11.7 11.7 
Number of trips per day 2 2 
VTTS per person (pence/min) 8.6 8.6 
Time per trip (min) 47 47 
Time savings per trip (min) 6 6 
Vehicle operating costs (pence/km) 47.5 12.3 
GC per day (£) 22.07 13.82 
Toll (£) 5.00 5.00 
Time Benefits (£) 1.40 1.40 
Reliability Benefits* (£) 0.35 0.35 
Change in GC (£) -3.25 -3.25 
Change in GC (%) -14.7 -23.5 
Change in Demand (%) 31 31 
Elasticity -2.1 -1.3 
 
Source: own calculations with numbers from Tables 7 and 9 
*Dodgson et al (2002) argue that reliability benefits are worth approximately 25% of 
time benefits. 
 
 
For the calculations following Mackie et al (2003) we considered three categories of 
trips: working, commuting, and other. 10 per cent of all trips made by car in London are 
for business purposes, 26 per cent for commuting, and 64 per cent for other purposes 
such as leisure, shopping, etc.
5
 We derived the value of working time from the gross 
weekly earning in London indicated in the New Earnings Survey 2003 (National 
Statistics, 2003). We took the VTTS for commuting and other purposes for different 
income levels from Mackie et al (2003), updated them to 2003 values, and calibrated 
them to the average salary in London. In this way, we estimated the average VTTS at 
32.9 pence/min, 7.7 pence/min, and 6.4 pence/min for working, commuting, and other 
purpose car trips. The weighted VTTS we used was therefore 9.4 pence/min, equivalent 
to 12.7 pence/min, assuming a car occupancy rate of 1.35. Thus, we obtained elasticities 
of –2.5 and –1.6, very similar to –2.1 and –1.3 of Table 10. 
Literature regarding elasticities of demand with respect to congestion charges is 
relatively rare. In Singapore, however, where charges are revised regularly, there has 
been considerable scope for evaluating effects of price changes. Dodgson et al (2002) 
summarize various studies for Singapore suggesting point elasticities in the order of 
–0.12 to –0.35 with respect to congestion charges. 
                                               
5
 These figures were provided by TfL on request and are part of the London Area Transport 
Survey 2001, Household Survey, Interim weighted data. They will be included in the London 
Travel Report 2003 when it is published. 
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More commonly calculated are elasticities of demand with respect to fuel prices. 
Goodwin (1992) calculated short-run and long-run elasticities of –0.16 and –0.32 
respectively. These numbers are still considered standard values for the responsiveness of 
car travel demand with respect to changes in fuel prices (Graham and Glaister, 2002). 
As a general rule, the sensitivity of demand to generalized cost changes will broadly 
be equal to the fuel price elasticity divided by the fuel share of generalized cost (Dodgson 
et al, 2002, p.28). For example, if fuel costs change by 10 per cent, but the share of fuel 
costs in terms of total costs is only one quarter, then generalized costs have changed by 
only 2.5 per cent. In heavily congested London, where time costs have a much larger 
share of total costs, the share of fuel costs can be estimated at roughly 8-16 per cent, with 
the higher range going to the ‘running costs only’ scenarios. Therefore, Goodwin’s value 
of –0.16 for short-run fuel price elasticity corresponds to a generalized cost elasticity of 
between –1.3 and –2.1, which are exactly the values computed in Table 10. 
These high elasticities in London are probably linked to the wide availability of 
public transport. In a region with poor public transport alternatives we would expect to 
observe a lower elasticity of demand for travel by car. 
 
Marginal congestion cost 
As explained earlier, the MCC is equal to the value of time divided by speed, then 
multiplied by the elasticity of speed with respect to flow. 
 
          sqe
qs
b
MCC
)(
            (5) 
 
This expression has typically been used to compute the MCC of vehicles on a given 
link. Here the same expression is used to compute an ‘area MCC’, where traffic is 
assumed to be homogeneous within the small, congested central zone with disregard for 
link versus intersection differences. 
The calculations within the central zone can thus be carried out assuming that speed 
within the zone has risen from 14 km/h to 17 km/h (21 per cent increase) and total traffic 
levels, measured in PCUs and including all vehicle types, have decreased by 15 per cent, 
as indicated in Table 6. 
The average VTTS within the central zone was estimated at 29.6 pence per PCU-min 
at 2003 prices. This value was computed using the pre-charging shares of traffic as 
implied by Table 6, their associated PCU values and occupancy rates, and trip purposes 
as provided by TfL on request. Following the practice set for the London Congestion 
Charging Research Programme (MVA Consultancy, 1995) and for the ROCOL study 
(ROCOL Working Group, 2000) a single value of time was used for all modes in the case 
of working time, and a single value of time was used for all person types in the case of 
non-working time. 
Ordinarily, flow is measured in terms of vehicles per hour on a link, however, in the 
context of an urban setting, this link-based measurement is less applicable. Therefore, the 
use of traffic volumes serves as a better proxy for flow in urban areas. Using this data, the 
implied area marginal cost of congestion is: 
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5.186
15.0
21.0
14
606.29


MCC  pence/PCU-km. 
 
When converted to veh-km from PCU-km using an average PCU/veh rate of 1.13, the 
calculated MCC is 165 pence/veh-km at 2003 prices. This calculated MCC value is 
higher than the value computed by Sansom et al (2001), who by estimating speed-flow 
relationships for a variety of road settings, calculated a MCC of 86 pence/veh-km 
updated to 2003 prices in a major urban center such as London. The values we estimated 
here however rest on the latest data and empirical evidence and are therefore more 
reliable. 
The estimated area MCC of £1.65 illustrates that in order for the £5 congestion 
charge to reflect on average the congestion externality, an average vehicle would need to 
travel a distance of about 3 km per day inside the charging zone, which is a reasonable 
expectation given that the zone has a diameter of roughly 5 km. 
 
COSTS AND BENEFITS 
The capital costs of the Scheme were approximately £200 million at 2003 prices, most of 
which were provided by the central government
6
. The annual operational costs and 
benefits are presented in Table 11, as detailed in the Six Months On report (TfL, 2003a). 
The table suggests a net benefit of around £50 million for the first year of operation. 
 
TABLE 11 Preliminary estimates of the annual costs and benefits of the London 
Scheme (£ million at 2003 prices) 
 
Annual Costs  
TfL administrative and other costs 5 
Scheme operation 90 
Additional bus costs 20 
Chargepayer compliance costs 15 
Total 130 
Annual Benefits  
Time savings to car and taxi occupants, business use 75 
Time savings to car and taxi occupants, private use 40 
Time savings to commercial vehicle occupants 20 
Times savings to bus passengers 20 
Reliability benefits to car, taxi and commercial vehicle occupants 10 
Reliability benefits to bus passengers 10 
Vehicle fuel and operating savings 10 
Accident savings 15 
Disbenefit to car occupants transferring to public transport, etc -20 
Total 180 
 
Source: TfL (2003a, Table 3) 
 
                                               
6
 Information provided by TfL. 
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A five-year monitoring programme has been set up, one year before the start of 
charging and four years after. It consists of over 100 surveys and studies, designed to 
measure and understand the impacts of the Scheme. Although one year into the Scheme 
may still be early to draw any conclusions, it is clear that the Scheme will have economic, 
social and environmental impacts. The monitoring programme is already assessing all 
these different aspects and Transport for London will produce annual reports describing 
and explaining them. 
Westminster City Council conducted a survey to find out how businesses felt about 
the congestion charge. From all the respondents, 68 per cent have their businesses inside 
the charging zone, 44 per cent are retailers and 27 per cent are bars and/or restaurants 
(Westminster City Council, 2003). Almost 69 per cent of the respondents feel the Scheme 
has had a negative impact on their business, 8 per cent feel it has had a positive impact, 
and 23 per cent feel it has had no impact. Almost 28 per cent of the respondents are 
considering relocating outside of the zone as a result of the charge. 
During October and November 2003 TfL carried out interview surveys of over 700 
businesses in and around the charging zone. Concerns about the negative impact of the 
Scheme have mainly come from the retail and leisure sectors, which reported a 2 per cent 
reduction in sales for the first half of 2003 (TfL, 2004). According to these sectors, the 
reasons for the decline in sales were economic and tourism factors, though congestion 
charging constituted about a fifth of the reported causes (TfL, 2004). 
TfL (2004) presents some preliminary evidence of the relationship between the 
reduction in sales, tourism and Underground patronage. The main conclusion is that retail 
sales and tourism numbers are strongly correlated and show a negative trend during the 
first months of 2003. Underground patronage during 2003 was 7-10 per cent lower in the 
charging zone and 4-7 per cent lower across the entire network, when compared with 
2002. When Underground travel is added on to the analysis, the significant reductions in 
Underground travel during Spring 2003 (reflecting not only lower tourism levels but also 
the Central line closure) coincide with the period of negative retail growth (TfL, 2004, 
p.25). Although the exact impact cannot be quantified there is clearly a link between the 
decline in Underground travel and in sales in the charging zone. If anything the Scheme 
encouraged the switch from the car to the Underground, so a reduction in Underground 
travel cannot be linked to the Scheme in any way. 
There are positive externalities from having a central area where the centers of 
government, law, business, finance, retail activity and entertainment are concentrated. 
With businesses considering relocation in the long run the benefits of the Scheme would 
be affected by losses in social welfare, mainly result of the loss of these positive 
externalities. It is early to determine what the trend will be and some more monitoring is 
needed before any conclusions can be drawn. 
 
USE OF REVENUES 
The Mayor’s Transport Strategy (GLA, 2001), as well as congestion reduction, also 
includes objectives such as investing in the Underground, improving bus services and 
integrating National Rail with other transport systems. The GLA Act 1999 (Acts of 
Parliament, 1999) ensures that revenues from charging schemes will be earmarked for the 
Mayor’s Transport Strategy projects for at least ten years from their implementation date. 
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Transport investment in London has been inadequate since the mid 1980s, and 
therefore unable to accommodate economic and demographic growth, resulting in high 
levels of congestion together with overcrowded and unreliable public transport (GLA, 
2001, p.23). The plan is to revert the situation by delivering the necessary additional 
public transport capacity and reliability in conjunction with demand management 
policies, such as congestion charging. 
The Scheme raised £68 million in 2003/04 and it is expected to raise £80 to £100 
million in future years for investment in transport.
7
 Transport improvements in London in 
2003/04 totaled £82.8 million at 2003 prices. The difference was covered with resources 
that become available from other sources such as increased revenues from public 
transport.
8
 TfL constantly monitors changes in revenues from the Scheme, other incomes 
and expenditure, and constantly adjusts the budget appropriately and makes reallocations 
where necessary. 
The Mayor’s Annual Report (GLA, 2004, p.51) gives details of the transport 
improvements carried out in the period 2003/04. Of the £82.8 million, £62.8 million were 
allocated to bus network improvements (higher frequencies, additional routes, enhanced 
route supervision and conversion to higher capacity routes); £10.5 million were allocated 
to road safety (research, engineering works, and education campaigns); £2 million were 
allocated to safer routes to schools, £6 million to walking and cycling (strategic and local 
engineering schemes on all London’s roads as well as information campaigns); and £1.5 
million to freight (measures to make the distribution of goods more sustainable). 
The fact that revenues are being returned to the transport sector is a very important 
factor in the success of the Scheme. Londoners can see where the money is going. The 
integrated nature of TfL seems to be a good example of the kind of coordination that may 
produce good social outcomes from a pricing scheme. 
 
EQUITY IMPACTS 
A regressive tax is a tax that takes a larger percentage of the income of low income 
people than of high income people. Strictly speaking, a congestion charge would not be a 
tax but it would be perceived as a tax by the motoring public. According to the System of 
National Accounts 1993 (Commission of the European Communities et al, 1993) taxes 
are ‘compulsory, unrequited payments’ for which ‘the government provides nothing in 
return to the individual unit making the payment, although governments may use the 
funds raised in taxes to provide goods or services to other units’. 
Whilst congestion charges are not taxes, they are still regressive in the sense that they 
do not vary with income (i.e. the charge paid by drivers is the same regardless of their 
income). A daily toll of £5 to drive into central London, for example, represents a larger 
percentage of the income of low income people than of the income of high income 
people. 
In that sense the Scheme may be having perverse impacts on lower income groups. 
Although the answer to this problem would be a switch to public transport, the necessary 
conditions of reliability, safety and frequency may have been met during the times of 
                                               
7
 Even though net revenues were £69 million ($108 million), net economic benefits were £50 
million ($78 million). 
8
 Information provided by GLA on request. 
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operation of the Scheme but not during other times and this may pose a problem. For 
example, when low income workers drive into the charging area at early hours in the 
morning (2 am for some butchers) the charge does not apply, yet they have to pay the 
charge when they finish work later in the morning and want to leave the zone to drive 
home. Public transport during the night is perceived as not frequent, safe or reliable and 
these low income workers have to choose between the inconvenience of traveling by bus 
or paying the charge when they finish work. Having said all this, the five year monitoring 
program will assess any impacts on equity when more evidence becomes available. 
With the data on traffic counts presented in Table 6 and the occupancy rates given in 
the London Travel Report 2002 (TfL, 2002b, Table 5.1, p.19) and in the Transport 
Economics Note (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2001, 
Table 2/3), we can conclude that 52 per cent of all people traveling to or from the 
charging zone used buses before the Scheme was introduced. If taxi and pedal and 
motorcycle users are added as well, the total share of people that did not use a chargeable 
mode of transport before the Scheme raises to 63.9 per cent. These are winners, in the 
sense that they are enjoying lower congestion without paying a penny, and they do not 
have any disutility from changing mode because they did not change mode. From a very 
conservative point of view the remaining 36.1 per cent would be losers. However, those 
with very high values of time also have a net benefit after paying the congestion charge. 
In addition to that, there are a number of exemptions and discounts, as given in Table 1. 
The share of people traveling by car was reduced from 27 per cent to 18 per cent, which 
means that 9 per cent of the original car users have transferred to some other mode or 
made alternative arrangements. This is the group listed in the second part of Table 11 as 
having a disbenefit of £20 million. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The preliminary results suggest that the London Scheme has so far been successful in 
achieving the stated congestion reduction targets. Traffic reduction has been higher than 
expected, which means that elasticities might have been underestimated prior to the 
implementation of the Scheme. Goodwin (2003) suggests that elasticities were revised 
down by a sort of ‘ratchet’ effect from one study to the next, probably because their 
authors wanted to be conservative, and would always choose the lowest estimate. The 
fact that public transport in London was substantially improved before the Scheme 
started, thus providing an alternative to the private car, may be the reason for these high 
elasticities of demand. 
The calculated area MCC suggests that the £5 charge is a reasonable approximate to 
marginal cost pricing. 
The largest potential hurdle, the political one, is perhaps where the largest success has 
been made. While economists have suggested for over 80 years now that drivers should 
face the true social cost of their actions, it is inevitably a politically unpopular decision to 
implement any form of charge on the act of driving. However, despite this, there has been 
surprisingly little public backlash. One of the reasons for this success is that the system is 
simple, feasible and transparent. Furthermore, the hypothecation of revenues, guaranteed 
by the Greater London Authority Act 1999 (Acts of Parliament, 1999), and a lengthy 
consultation process that preceded the introduction of the Scheme provided a feeling of 
trust to the public in knowing where their money would be spent. Surveys carried out by 
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Market & Opinion Research International, an independently-owned market research 
company in the UK, show that although only 50 per cent of London residents support the 
Scheme, 73 per cent think it has been effective at reducing congestion (Market & 
Opinion Research International, 2003). 
Public consultation on a revision to the Mayor’s Transport Strategy began on 16 
February 2004 for ten weeks. The revision would allow an extension of the charging zone 
to include parts of the City of Westminster and the Royal Borough of Kensington and 
Chelsea (GLA, 2004, p.52). This reform, which would double the size of the charging 
area, would imply higher revenues, which would allow higher investment in public 
transport. 
In London, where traffic had returned to speeds of 100 years ago (TfL, 2002c) the 
costs of congestion were recognized as being too high and the public acknowledged that 
supply-side measures do not work in themselves. The introduction of congestion charging 
to one of the major cities of the world is perhaps a sign that the world is ready to shift 
road pricing from its theoretical hideaway to a practical center-stage. 
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